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1.  Introduction  
Donald  Davidson’s  conception  of  motivating  or  “primary”  reasons  for  action  as  belief-desire  pairs                          
was  and  remains  hugely  in uential  in  action  theory.  But  it  does  not  enjoy  comparable  in uence  in                                1
moral  theory.  Primary  reasons  are  often  treated  as  categorically  distinct  from  moral  reasons,  and                            2
from  normative  reasons  more  generally,  usually  on  the  grounds  that  moral  reasons  (i)  can  be                              
motivating  reasons  and  (ii)  are  facts.  This  reasoning  underlies  an  orthodoxy  according  to  which                            
both  motivating  and  normative  reasons  are  facts,  propositions,  or  states  of  a airs.  3
 
But  the  thesis  that  normative  reasons  for  action  are  primary  reasons  enjoys  better  support  than  its                                
critics  imagine.  This  paper  defends  this  thesis,  proceeding  as  follows.  I  begin  by  showing  that  a                                
popular  view  about  what  makes  reasons  normative  implies  that  normative  reasons  are  primary                          
reasons  because  primary  reasons  draw  crucial  distinctions  in  our  motives  that  facts  generally  don’t.                            
I’ll  then  show  that  because  primary  reasons  draw  crucial  distinctions  between  kinds  of  justi cation                            
that  facts  generally  don’t,  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons.  Finally,  I’ll  describe  an  important                            
but  underappreciated  problem  for  the  orthodox  conception  of  normative  reasons  and  show  that  it                            
does  not  arise  for  the  competing  Davidsonian  conception.  These  three  claims  form  the  basis  for                              
thinking  of  normative  reasons  for  action  as  primary  reasons.  
 
The  primary  reasons  I  discuss  di er  in  one  important  respect  from  the  ones  that  Davidson                              
describes,  at  least  on  one  reading.  According  to  that  reading,  primary  reasons  are  pairs  of  tokened                                
beliefs  and  desires.  For  example,  when  I  intentionally  drink  water,  my  primary  reason,  on  this  view,                                
is  my  belief  that  water  will  quench  my  thirst  paired  with  my  desire  to  quench  my  thirst.  This                                    
conception  of  primary  reasons  prevents  them  from  being  normative  reasons.  That’s  because  agents                          
can  have  a  normative  reason  for  acting  without  tokening  any  of  the  belief-desire  pairs  relevant  to                                
that  action.  This  happens  when  agents  are  not  moved  to  do  what  they  morally  should.  So                                
normative  reasons  cannot  be  pairs  of  beliefs  and  desires.  
 
 
1  See  his  “Actions,  Reasons,  and  Causes,” The  Journal  of  Philosophy  60.23  (1963):  pp.  685-700.  I’m  using  ‘desire’  in                                      
Davidson’s  broad  sense  to  denote  a  wide  range  of  pro-attitudes.  
2  There  are  exceptions.  For  example,  Robert  Myers  defends  the  thesis  that  desires  relate  us  to  normative  reasons  in                                      
“Desires  and  Normative  Truths:  A  Holist's  Response  to  the  Sceptics,” Mind  121  (2012),  pp.  375-406.  Paul  Hurley                                  
defends  a  related  view  in  “ Desire,  Judgment,  and  Reason:  Exploring  the  Path  Not  Taken,” The  Journal  of  Ethics ,  11.4                                      
(2007):  pp.  437-463.  
3  Prominent  recent  advocates  of  this  view  include, inter  magna  alia ,  Jonathan  Dancy  in Practical  Reality  (Oxford                                  
University  Press,  2000),  Mark  Schroeder  in Slaves  of  the  Passions (Oxford  University  Press,  2007),  Daniel  Star  in                                  
Knowing  Better  (Oxford  University  Press,  2015),  and  Errol  Lord  in The  Importance  of  Being  Rational  (Oxford                                
University  Press,  2018).  
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 2.  Primary  Reasons  and  Good  Reasoning  
Rather,  I’ll  instead  assume  that  primary  reasons  are  the  contents  of  those  belief-desire  pairs.  On  this                                
account,  when  I  intentionally  drink  water,  my  primary  reason  is  the  content  of  the  belief  that  water                                  
will  quench  my  thirst  paired  with  the  content  of  desire  to  quench  my  thirst, i.e. ,  the fact  that  water                                      
will  quench  my  thirst  and  the goal  of  quenching  my  thirst.  So,  on  the  view  I  assume,  the  primary                                      
reasons  eligible  to  be  normative  reasons  are  fact-goal  pairs.  What  gives  this  view  continuity  with                              
Davidson’s  is  that  its  primary  reasons  are  the  contents  of  Davidson’s  reasons.   
 
While  this  paper  focuses  on  advantages  for  moral  theorizing  that  come  from  thinking  of  normative                              
reasons  as  fact-goal  pairs,  this  conception  of  reasons  may  also  circumvent  a  well-known  challenge  to                              
Davidson’s  programme  in  the  philosophy  of  action.  It  is  often  assumed  that  reasons  are  what  we                                
deliberate  about  when  we  act  intentionally.  However,  as  several  philosophers  have  observed,  our                          4 5
psychological  states  are  not  normally  the  things about which  we  deliberate;  they  are  merely  the                              
things in  virtue  of  which  we  deliberate.  So  motivating  reasons,  these  philosophers  conclude,  cannot                            
be  primary  reasons  if  primary  reasons  are  psychological  states.  However,  thinking  of  primary                          
reasons  as  the  contents  of  belief-desire  pairs,  rather  than  as  the  beliefs  and  desires  themselves,                              
dispenses  with  this  worry  about  psychologism  while  remaining  recognizably  Davidsonian.  As  a                        
result,  there  are  independent  grounds  for  thinking  of  motivating  reasons  as  the  contents  of                            
belief-desire  pairs.  However,  I  won’t  dwell  on  this  discussion,  turning  instead  to  the  titular  claim                              
that  normative  reasons  should  be  thought  of  as  primary  reasons.  
 
Two  questions  about  normative  reasons  easy  to  elide.  The   rst  concerns  what makes  or grounds                              
something’s  status  as  a  normative  reason.  The  second  concerns  what kinds  of  things  can  enjoy  that                                
status,  that  is,  what  things  are  eligible  to  be  normative  reasons.  To  illustrate,  note  that  the  question                                  
of  what  makes  someone  a  MLB  baseball  player  di ers  from  the  question  of  what  MLB  baseball                                
players  are.  What  makes  someone  a  MLB  baseball  player  is  signing  a  MLB  contract.  That’s  an                                
answer  to  the   rst  question  but  applied  to  baseball  players,  not  reasons.  However,  only people  are                                
baseball  players.  That’s  an  answer  to  the  second  question.  Moral  philosophers  tend  to  focus  on  the                                
 rst  question  about  reasons.  But  this  paper  is  principally  concerned  with  the  upshots  of  a                              
Davidsonian  answer  to  the  second  question.  As  a  result,  the  call  to  think  of  primary  reasons  as                                  
normative  reasons  is  a  call  to  consider  a  new model  for  theories  of  normative  reasons,  for  the  model                                    
of  reasons  we  assume  shapes  our  downstream  inquiry  about  which  reasons  are  genuinely  normative                            
and  about  what  makes  them  normative.  
 
Some  accounts  about  what  makes  a  reason  normative,  the   rst  question,  are  neutral  on  the  second                                
question  of  what  things  are  reasons.  For  example,  Derek  Par t  and  T.  M.  Scanlon’s  position  that                                
the  normativity  of  reasons  is  primitive  --  that nothing  grounds  something’s  status  as  a  reason  --                                
4  Schroeder  (2007)  calls  this  ‘the  deliberative  constraint’  in  op.  cit. ,  p.26.  
5  Thomas  Nagel  o ers  this  criticism  in The  View  from  Nowhere  (Oxford  University  Press  ,  1986),  pp.141-3.  Jonathan                                    
Dancy  continues  this  line  of  criticism  in  Practical  Reality ,  chapter  four.  
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 implies  no  constraints  on  what  reasons  are,  all  by  itself.  That’s  not  to  say  that  Par t  or  Scanlon  are                                      6
silent  on  the  second  question  of  what  reasons  are.  On  the  contrary,  they  appear  to  agree  that                                  
reasons  are  facts.  Rather,  the  point  I  wish  to  highlight  is  that  the  grounds  for  their  agreement  is                                    
independent  of  their  account  of  what  makes  reasons  normative.  As  a  result,  their  primitivism  is                              
compatible  with  the  thesis  that  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons.  
 
By  contrast,  some  competing  accounts  of  what  makes  reasons  normative do  impose  constraints  on                            
what  things  are  reasons;  that  is,  their  distinctive  answer  to  the   rst  question  constrains  their  answer                                
to  the  second.  These  accounts  are  of  particular  interest  here  for  some  such  constraints  make  it                                
especially  appealing  to  think  of  normative  reasons  for  action  as  primary  reasons.  For  example,                            
Bernard  Williams  famously  argued  that  there  is  a  normative  reason  for  you  to  do  something  only  if                                  
that  reason  is,  in  some  sense,  be  capable  of  motivating  you  to  act  in  that  way  through  deliberation.                                    
Some  accounts  hold  that  this  deliberative  role  of  normative  reasons  is  the  key  to  answering  the   rst                                  
question  about  reasons,  arguing,  broadly,  that  a  reason  is  normative  just  when  and  because  it                              
 gures  in  an  episode  of  good  reasoning.  In  particular,  some  think  that  a  reason  for  action  is                                  7
normative  just  when  and  because  it  is  a good  basis  for  acting  that  way.  Call  this the  good  basis                                      8
account.  
 
Unlike  the  primitivist  account,  the  good  basis  account  straightforwardly  constrains  what  kinds  of                          
things  can  be  reasons.  Clearly,  only  bases  for  action  can  be good  bases  for  action  --  and  our  bases  for                                        
action  are  our  motivating  reasons.  Consequently,  the  good  basis  account  implies  that  all  normative                            
reasons  are  motivating  reasons  and,  as  a  result,  if  the  account  is  true,  then  conclusions  about  the                                  
ontology  of  motivating  reasons  settle  questions  about  the  ontology  of  normative  reasons.  
 
This  connection  between  kinds  of  reasons  provides  the   rst  argument  for  thinking  that  normative                            
reasons  are  primary  reasons.  The  argument  begins  with  the  observation  that  since  primary  reasons                            
are  individuated  not  just  by  the  facts  that  they  contain  but  also  by  their  goals,  primary  reasons  are                                    
strictly  more   nely  grained  than  the  corresponding  facts.  This   neness  of  grain  makes  primary                            
reasons  appealing  motivating  reasons  because,  as  I’ll  now  show,  claims  about  our  motives  are                            
similarly   nely-grained.  For  example,  it  seems  plausible  that  the  Cubs  fan  and  the  Cubs  hater  can                                
head  to  Wrigley  only  because  the  Cubs  are  playing.  Despite  responding  to  the  same  fact,  the  two                                  
baseball  fans’  goals  in  going  to  Wrigley  di er:  one  goes  to  Wrigley  to  see  the  Cubs  win;  the  other                                      
6  See  T.  M.  Scanlon’s What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other  (Harvard  University  Press,  1998)  and  Derek  Par t’s On  What                                        
Matters  Volumes  1  and  2  (Oxford  University  Press,  2011). 
7  For  example,  in Reasons  Without  Rationalism  (Oxford  University  Press,  2010),  Kieran  Setiya  argues,  roughly,  that  a                                  
consideration  gives  a  normative  reason  for  an  agent  to  act  in  some  way  just  when,  given  the  agent’s  psychology,  being                                        
moved  to  act  in  that  way  by  that  consideration  is  a  ‘good  disposition  of  practical  thought’  (77).  Matthew  Silverstein                                      
argues  in  “Reducing  Reasons”  in Journal  of  Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy  10.1  (2016):  1–22  that  this  condition  is  met                                      
just  when  the  considerations   gure  in  ‘sound  reasoning’.  Jonathan  Way  argues  in  “Reasons  as  Premises  of  Good                                  
Reasoning,” Paciﬁc  Philosophical  Quarterly  98.2  (2017):  2051-270  that  reasons  to  φ  are  normative  when  they’re                              
‘appropriate  premises  for  reasoning  towards  φ-ing’.  Hille  Paakkunainen  defends  the  view  that  normative  reasons  are                              
premises  in  good  practical  reasoning  in  her  “Can  There  Be  Government  House  Reasons  for  Action?”  in Journal  of                                    
Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy  12.1  (2017):  56–93.  
8  Alex  Gregory  defends  this  view  in  “Normative  Reasons  as  Good  Bases,” Philosophical  Studies 173.9  (2016):                                
2291-2310.  
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 goes  to  see  them  lose.  However,  if  motivating  reasons  are  simply  facts,  then  we’re  forced  to  concede,                                  
counterintuitively,  that  the  hater  and  the  fan  go  to  Wrigley  for  the  same  reason  because  they  act  on                                    
the  basis  of  the  same  fact.  But  that  seems  clearly  wrong  --  after  all,  one  goes  to  Wrigley  to  see  the                                          
Cubs  win  and  the  other  goes  to  see  the  Cubs  lose.  
  
This  argument  suggests  that  motivating  reasons  are  more   nely-grained  than  facts  for,  as  in  the                              
Cubs  case,  a  single  fact  can  provide  two  distinct  motivating  reasons.  But  we  can  appropriate  one  of                                  
Davidson’s  observations  to  support  the  stronger  conclusion  that  motivating  reasons  are  more                        
 nely-grained  than  facts  in  the  manner  of  primary  reasons.  Davidson  writes,   
 
A  primary  reason  consists  of  a  belief  and  a  pro-attitude,  but  it  is  generally  otiose  to  mention                                  
both.  If  you  tell  me  you  are  easing  the  jib  because  you  think  that  will  stop  the  main  from                                      
backing,  I  don't  need  to  be  told  that  you  want  to  stop  the  main  from  backing;  and  if  you                                      
say  you  are  biting  your  thumb  at  me  because  you  want  to  insult  me,  there  is  no  point  in                                      
adding  that  you  think  that  by  biting  your  thumb  at  me  you  will  insult  me.  9
 
In  the  example,  when  you  ease  the  jib,  we  can  say  that  the  reason  you’re  easing  the  jib  is that  it  will                                            
stop  the  main  from  backing or  we  can  say  that  the  reason  you’re  doing  so  is to  stop  the  main  from                                          
backing.  On  a  Davidsonian  picture,  these  two  claims  attribute  the  same  motivating  reason.  One                            
uses  a that -clause  and  one  uses  a to -clause,  each  of  which  refers  to  one  of  the  reason’s  two  parts.  The                                        
 rst  refers  to  the  part  corresponding  to  the  belief  that  easing  the  jib  will  stop  the  main  from                                    
backing.  The  second  refers  to  the  part  corresponding  to  the  desire  to  stop  the  main  from  backing.                                  
Nevertheless,  it’s  natural  to  run  these  claims  together  for  we  can  pick  out  this  single  reason  by                                  
naming  either  of  its  parts.  Indeed,  it’s  often  excessive  to  use  both  claims,  as  Davidson  observes.  That                                  
these  di erent  claims  pick  out  di erent  parts  of  the  same  reason  explains  why  we  often  elide  them                                  
unless  we’re  careful.  
 
The  Cubs  fan  and  the  Cubs  hater  go  to  Wrigley  for  di erent  reasons.  We  can  identify  these  distinct                                    
reasons  given  by  the  fact  that  the  Cubs  are  playing  at  Wrigley  through to -clauses:  the  Cubs  fan’s                                  
reason  for  going  to  Wrigley  is to  see  the  Cubs  win ;  the  Cubs  hater’s  reason  for  going  to  Wrigley  is to                                          
see  the  Cubs  lose .  The  cogency  of  these  two  claims  and  the  fact  that  they  appear  to  name  goals,  the                                        
contents  of  the  desire  to  see  the  Cubs  win  and  the  desire  to  see  the  Cubs  lose,  respectively,  o ers                                      
independent  reason  for  doubting  that  motivating  reasons  are  just  facts.  Although  the  orthodox                          
view  predicts  that  if  two  agents  act  on  the  basis  of  the  same  fact,  then  they  act  for  the  same  reason,                                          
thinking  of  motivating  reasons  as  primary  reasons  gives  motivating  reasons  their  intuitive   neness                          
of  grain.  This  is  good  grounds  for  thinking  that  all  possible  motivating  reasons  are  primary  reasons.                                
And  if  all  normative  reasons  are  possible  motivating  reasons,  as  the  good  basis  account  implies,  then                                
we  should  think  that  all  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons  as  well.  
 
9  Davidson  (1963),  op.  cit. ,  p.688.   
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 Advocates  of  the  orthodoxy  can  resist  this  argument  in  at  least  three  ways.  First,  they  may  insist  that                                    
goals  are  facts  and  that  the  case  is,  therefore,  consistent  with  the  orthodox  view.  In  other  words,                                  
they  may  insist  that  agents  who  act  for  di erent  goals  on  the  basis  of  di erent  facts  and  thereby  act                                      
for  di erent  reasons.  But  this  response  fails  because  goals  are  not  facts.  The  most  decisive  argument                                
for  the  distinction  between  goals  and  facts  involves  wading  into  the  muddy  waters  of  the  semantics                                
of to -clauses:  if to -clauses  do  not  denote  propositions,  as  some  theorists  think,  then  they  cannot                              10
express  facts.  Though  I  agree  with  these  theorists  that to -clauses  do  not  denote  propositions,  I                              
haven’t  the  space  to  explore  that  rebuttal  here.   
 
A  simpler  argument  for  the  distinction  between  facts  and  goals  is  that  goals  don’t  need  to  be  true  to                                      
give  normative  reasons,  but  propositions  need  to  be  true,  that  is,  to  be facts ,  to  give  normative                                  
reasons.  For  example,  if  I  desire to  drink  water,  some  think  that  said  desire  is  equivalent  to  the                                    11
desire that  I  drink  water,  assessed  in  some de  se  or   rst-personal  mode.  However,  I  can  desire  to                                    
drink  water  when  I’m  not  drinking  water.  In  that  situation,  assuming  that  the  contents  of  desires                                
are  propositions,  the  content  of  my  desire  to  drink  water  is  not  true.  Nevertheless,  the  goal  of                                  
drinking  water  gives  me  a  prudential  reason  to  go  to  the  water  fountain  when  I’m  thirsty.                                
Consequently,  goals  needn’t  be  truths  to  give  reasons,  so  goals  don’t  play  the  role  of  facts  in                                  
normative  reasons.  A   nal  rebuttal  rests  in  observing  that  facts  and  goals  move  us  di erently.  For                                12
example,  it  is  widely  assumed  that  facts  cannot  move  us  as  motivating  reasons  unless  we  believe                                
them.  But,  even  if  goals  were  facts,  we  needn’t  bear  a cognitive  relation  to  them  when  they                                  13
motivate  us;  only  a conative  one.  Consequently,  there’s  an  important  motivational  di erence                        
between  facts  and  goals  for  which  with  the  orthodox  view  does  not  account.  This  is  reason  enough                                  
to  look  beyond  the  view.  
 
10  I  am  sceptical  that  non- nite  clauses  like  ‘to  drink  water’  denote  propositions  when  embedded  in  reasons                                  
attributions,  largely  for  reasons  laid  out  in  Gennaro  Chierchia’s  “Anaphora  and  attitudes de  se ”  in Semantics  and                                  
Contextual  Expressions ,  edited  by  Bartsch,  van  Benthem  &  van  Emde  Boas  (Kluwer  &  Reidel,  1989),  which  trace  back                                    
to  David  Lewis’s  “Attitudes De  Dicto  and De  Se, ” The  Philosophical  Review ,  88.4  (1979):  513-543.  Theorists  have  since                                    
developed  this  position,  providing  both  compositionally-  and  semantically-grounded  resistance  to  the  claim  that                          
to -clauses  denote  propositions.  For  example,  Lucy  Campbell’s  “Propositionalism  about  intention,” Canadian  Journal                        
of  Philosophy  49  (2019):  230-252,  especially  pp.  241-7,  and  Nate  Charlow’s  “Metasemantic  Quandaries”  in Meaning,                              
Decision,  and  Norms:  Themes  from  the  Work  of  Allan  Gibbard ,  edited  by Dunaway  and  Plunkett  (University  of                                  
Michigan,  forthcoming),  each  argue  that  compositional  arguments  for  thinking  that to -clauses  express  covert  pronouns                            
are  undermotivated.  Likewise,  David  Plunkett,  Howard  Nye,  and  John  Ku’s  “Non-Consequentialism  Demysti ed,”                        
Philosophers’  Imprint  15.4  (2015):  1-28  and  Michael  Milona  and  Mark  Schroeder’s  “Desiring  Under  the  Proper  Guise”                                
in Oxford  Studies  in  Metaethics  Vol.  14 ,  edited  by  Russ  Shafer-Landau  (Oxford,  forthcoming),  identify  semantic                              
di erences  between  what  to -clauses  and  closely  related  sentential  clauses  express.  
11  Some,  like  Schroeder  (2007), op.  cit. ,  distinguish  between  subjective  and  objective  normative  reasons,  allowing  that                                
the  former  can  be  false  propositions.  A cionados  of  this  view  should  read  my  claims  as  implicitly  restricted  to  objective                                      
normative  reasons.  
12  Pettit  and  Smith  contrast  the  di erent  deliberative  roles  played  by  beliefs  and  desires  in  “Backgrounding  Desire,”                                  
Philosophical  Review  99.4  (1990):  565-592,  but  the  parallel  point  holds  for  facts  and  goals.  Mark  Johnston’s  “The                                  
Authority  of  A ect”  in Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research  63.1  (2001):  181-214  also  illuminates  desire’s                            
background  role  in  deliberation.  
13  Chapter  four  of  Lord  (2018),  op.  cit. ,  o ers  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  this  claim.  
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 However,  philosophers  can  resist  this  argument  two  other  ways,  by  denying  either  of  two  other                              
claims  on  which  it  rests.  They  may  deny  that  all  normative  reasons  are  motivating  reasons.  Or                                14
they  may  deny  that  the  Cubs  fan  and  the  Cubs  hater  go  to  Wrigley  for  di erent  reasons,   nding  it                                      
natural  to  think  that  they  go  to  Wrigley  for  the  same  reason  precisely  because  they  go  on  the  basis  of                                        
the  same  fact.  Fortunately,  these  two  responses  can  be  rebutted  by  a  distinct  but  closely  related                                
argument  that  does  not  depend  on  either  claim.  
 
3.  Distinguishing  Prudential  and  Moral  Reasons  
Consider  two  agents:  the  pure  egoist  and  the  pure  altruist.  The  pure  egoist  cares  only  for  herself;                                  
she  is  motivated only  by  prudential  reasons.  The  pure  altruist  cares  only  for  others;  she  is  motivated                                  
only  by  moral  reasons.  As  a  result,  these  two  agents  are  motivated  in  wholly  di erent  ways  and                                  15
since  motivating  reasons  characterize  our  motives,  these  two  agents  never  act  the  same  way  for  the                                
same  reason,  given  the  schism  between  their  motives.  
 
If  we  add  the  orthodox  supposition  that  normative  reasons  are  facts,  the  scenario  implies  that  these                                
two  agents  never  perform  an  action  on  the  basis  of  the  same  fact.  But  that’s  clearly  false.  For                                    
example,  each  can  be  moved  to  save  a  child  because  the  child  is  drowning.  This  is  possible  because                                    
the  altruist’s  and  the  egoist’s  goals  di er.  The  altruist  is  moved,  we  may  suppose,  by  her  goal  of                                    
respecting  and  preserving  human  life.  By  contrast,  the  egoist  is  moved,  we  may  suppose,  by  her  goal                                  
of  being  esteemed  and  rewarded  for  saving  the  child.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible  for  the  same  fact,                                  
and  only  that  fact,  to  move  each  to  perform  the  same  act.  We  must,  therefore,  reject  one  of  the                                      
foregoing  claims.  As  I’ll  argue,  the  least  plausible  claim  is  the  orthodox  view  that  reasons  are  facts.  
 
Like  the  case  of  the  Cubs  fan  and  the  Cubs  hater,  this  case  suggests  only  that  acting  on  the  basis  of                                          
the  same  fact  does  not  su ce  for  acting  for  the  same  reason;  it  does  not  entail  that  normative                                    
reasons  are  primary  reasons.  However,  primary  reasons  o er  an  enticing  explanation  of  exactly  how                            
reasons  are  more   nely  grained  than  facts  for  it  o ers  an  explanation  of  how  reasons  resemble  facts                                  
enough  to  be  confused  for  them.  For  example,  if  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons,  then                              
distinct  normative  reasons,  like  the  egoist’s  prudential  reason  and  the  altruist’s  moral  reason,  can                            
overlap  on  the  same  fact  while  nevertheless  remaining  distinct  in  virtue  of  containing  di erent                            
goals.   
 
Indeed,  a  now-familiar  reason  exists  for  thinking  that  normative  reasons  contain  both  goals  and                            
facts.  Strikingly,  Davidson’s  observation  that  we  attribute  motivating  reasons  in  two  di erent  ways,                          
which  correspond  to  primary  reasons’  two  parts,  also  holds  for  the  attributions  of  normative                            
reasons.  For  example,  we  can  claim  that  a moral  reason  to  save  the  drowning  child  is  to  respect  and                                      
preserve  human  life.  Likewise,  we  can  claim  that  a prudential  reason  to  save  the  drowning  child  is                                  
14  Indeed,  some  like  Smith  (1994), op . cit. ,  and  Susanne  Mantel  in Determined  by  Reasons  (Routledge,  2018)  deny  that                                      
normative  reasons  can  be  motivating  reasons.  The  burden  on  such  views  is  to  show  why, pace common  sense,  we                                      
cannot  straightforwardly  act  for  good  normative  reasons.  For  this  reason,  I  bracket  such  views  for  the  remainder  of  the                                      
paper.   
15  For  simplicity,  assume  that  these  agents  are  never  mistaken  about  whether  a  reason  is  moral  or  prudential.  
6  
 to  be  esteemed  and  rewarded.  If  taken  at  face  value,  these to -clause  reasons  attributions  track                              
di erences  between  moral  and  prudential  reasons,  just  as  more  familiar that -clause  reasons                        
attributions  are  thought  to.   
 
Because  these  claims  involve  the  attribution  of  prudential  and  moral  reasons,  they  provide  strong                            
evidence  that,  for  example,  the  goal  of  respecting  and  preserving  human  life  is  part  of  a  moral                                  
reason  while  the  goal  of  being  esteemed  and  rewarded  is  not.  However,  despite  my  great  sympathy                                
for  these  claims,  I  stress  that  I  am  simply  assuming  that  they  are  true  in  order  to  illustrate  the  dual                                        
aspect  view.  Indeed,  I  am  not  defending  any  particular  view  about  which  reasons  are  normative,                              
much  less  about  which  reasons  are  moral  or  prudential,  in  particular.  I  am  simply  defending  a                                
particular  model  or  ontology  of  reasons  according  to  which  they  are  pairs  of  facts  and  goals,  rather                                  
than  just  facts  or  fact-like  entities.   
 
In  contrast  to  §2’s  argument,  this  argument  does  not  rely  on  the  premise  that  all  normative  reasons                                  
are  motivating  reasons,  so  one  cannot  resist  the  conclusion  that  normative  reasons  are  primary                            
reasons  by  denying  that  all  normative  reasons  are  motivating  reasons.  Nevertheless,  like  §2’s                          
argument,  it  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  egoist  and  the  altruist  act  for  di erent  reasons  despite                                  
acting  on  the  basis  of  the  same  fact.  Given  the  deep  divide  in  their  motives,  this  claim  is  compelling.                                      
Nevertheless,  some  may  be  tempted  to  insist  that  the  altruist  and  egoist  act  for  the  same  reason  by                                    
insisting  that  some  moral  and  prudential  reasons  for  an  agent  to  do  something  are  identical.  I’ll                                
now  provide  a  third  argument,  which  shows  that  moral  and  prudential  reasons  for  an  agent  to  act                                  
in  some  way  must  be  distinct,  so  we  should  accept  that  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons.  
 
4.  Weighing  Explanations  
Defenders  of  the  orthodoxy  may  read  the  case  of  the  egoist  and  altruist  di erently.  They  may  take  it                                    
to  show  that  if  a  single  fact  gives  both  a  prudential  reason  for  a  certain  agent  to  save  the  child  and  a                                            
moral  reason  to  do  the  same,  then  some  facts,  like  that  a  child  is  drowning,  are  sometimes both                                    
prudential  and  moral  reasons  for  the  agent  to  save  the  child,  simultaneously.  This  implies  that,                              
counterintuitively,  the  egoist  and  the  altruist  can  act  for  the  same  reason  precisely because  they  can                                
act  on  the  basis  of  the  same  fact.  However,  as  I’ll  now  argue,  di erent  kinds  of  normative  reasons                                    
for  action,  like  prudential  and  moral  reasons, must  be  numerically  distinct  if  reasons  are  to  play                                
their  most  central  role  in  moral  philosophy,  namely,  their  role  in weighing  explanations  of                            
normative  facts.  In  other  words,  I’ll  show  that  weighing  explanations  require  primary  reasons’                          
 neness  of  grain.   
 
When  deliberating  about  what  to  do,  we  ‘weigh’  considerations.  For  example,  that  wine  is  tasty                              
favours  drinking  another  glass.  But  that  I’ll  feel  terrible  in  the  morning  if  I  do  favours  abstaining.                                  
When  deliberating  about  whether  to  have  another  glass,  I  assess  how  strongly  each  consideration                            
bears  on  what  to  do  --  how weighty  each  consideration  is  --  and  act  on  the  consideration  I  deem                                      
weightier.  Weighing  explanations  of  what  you  should  do  resemble  this  picture  of  deliberation.                          
What  one  should  do  is  explained  by  the  balance  of  reasons  for  or  against  the  relevant  options.                                  
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 Reasons  are  more  or  less  weighty  as  a  function  of  how  strongly  each  bears  on  the  question  of  what                                      
to  do.  
 
Questions  about  what  someone  should  do  can  be  answered  in  a  similar  manner.  Of  course,  ‘should’                                
has  di erent  senses,  which  are  explained  by  di erent  groups  of  reasons.  It  is  controversial  whether                              
there  is  an  unrestricted,  “all-things-considered”  sense  of  ‘should’,  where  all  reasons  are  relevant.                          16
But  there  are  clearly  senses  of  ‘should’  --  like  its  rational,  moral,  or  prudential  senses  --  where  only                                    
certain  reasons  are  relevant.  For  example,  that  I’ve  promised  to  show  up  on  time  for  dinner  tonight                                  
is  a  moral  reason  to  show  up  on  time.  But  if,  on  my  way  to  dinner,  I  see  a  cyclist  get  into  an                                              
accident,  then  that’s  a  moral  reason  not  to  show  up  on  time,  and  to  stay  behind  to  help  the  cyclist                                        
instead.  What  I  should  do  in  this  circumstance,  morally  speaking,  depends  on  the  weights  of  these                                
two  reasons.  If  the  promise  is  especially  important  --  say,  a  promise  to  my  beloved  to  show  up  on                                      
time  to  our  wedding  reception  --  then  that’s  a  weighty  reason  to  show  up  on  time.  And  if  the                                      
cyclist’s  injuries  are  especially  grave,  then  that’s  an  especially  weighty  reason  to  stay  behind.   
 
Suppose  that,  in  this  particular  circumstance,  both  reasons  are  equally  weighty.  In  that  case,  you                              
may  keep  the  promise  or  you  may  stay  behind.  Either  option  is  morally  permissible.  Crucially,  only                                
moral  reasons   gure  in  this  balance.  For  example,  imagine  that  the  cyclist  o ers  you  ten  dollars  to                                  17
help  them.  The  reason  given  by  this  reward,  suppose,  shifts  the  balance  of all  reasons,  making  the                                  
otherwise  perfectly  counterbalanced  set  of  reasons  to  help  the  cyclist  weightier  than  the  set  of                              
reasons  to  keep  the  promise.  In  that  case,  you  should,  all  things  considered,  help  the  cyclist  rather                                  
than  keep  the  promise.  Nevertheless,  even  if  the  cyclist  o ers  a  reward  to  break  the  promise,  you                                  
may,  morally  speaking,  keep  it.  The  reward  is  irrelevant  to  what  you  should  do,  morally  speaking,                                
because  it  gives  a  merely  prudential  reason  to  help,  which  must  be  ignored  when  determining  the                                
balance  of  moral  reasons.  
 
More  generally,  the  balance  of  a  set  of  reasons  explains  what  someone  should  do,  in  any  of  the                                    
restricted  senses  of  ‘should’,  ‘may’,  and  so  on,  only  if  that  set  meets  two  criteria.  It  must  include                                    
only  reasons  relevant  to  the  restricted  sense  in  question.  Otherwise  it  risks  assigning  too  much                              
weight  to  one  of  the  options.  Likewise,  the  set  of  reasons  must  also  include all  the  relevant  reasons.                                    
Otherwise  it  risks  assigning  too  little  weight  to  one  of  the  options.  When  some  fact  gives  two                                  
reasons,  one  relevant  to  a  weighing  explanation  and  one  irrelevant,  we  must  include  the  former  and                                
exclude  the  latter.   
 
The  trouble  with  claiming  that  a  single  fact  is  both  a  moral  and  a  prudential  reason  now  emerges.                                    
Suppose  that  two  children,  qualitatively  identical  in  all  morally  relevant  respects,  are  drowning  and                            
only  one  can  be  saved.  Consequently,  you  may  save  either,  but  you  must  save  one.  Moreover,  one                                  
child  is  from  a  rich  family;  the  other  child  is  not.  The  person  who  saves  the   rst  child  will  be  richly                                          
rewarded.  Not  so  for  the  second.  Supposing  that  reasons  are  facts,  the  fact  that  the  rich  child  is                                    
16  See,  for  example,  Derek  Baker’s  “Skepticism  about  Ought  Simpliciter”  in  Oxford  Studies  in  Metaethics  13  (2018):  
230-252 .  
17  I  am  bracketing  the  complexities  engendered  by  supererogation  for  the  moment.   
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 drowning  is  a  moral  reason  to  save  them.  It’s  also  a  prudential  reason  to  save  them.  This  creates  a                                      
dilemma.  Either  we  include  that  fact  when  determining  the  balance  of  moral  reasons,  or  we  do  not.                                  
If  we  do  include  it,  we’ll  have  allowed  a  prudential  reason  to  distort  the  balance  of  moral  reasons.                                    
The  prudential  dimension  of  that  fact  distorts  the  balance  of  moral  reasons  in  precisely  the  same                                
way  that  the  cyclist’s  reward  does,  creating  a  specious  moral  obligation  to  save  the  rich  child  where                                  
there  is  none.  However,  if  we  exclude  the  fact,  then  we’ll  have  ignored  a  morally  relevant  reason,                                  
thereby  distorting  the  balance  of  moral  reasons;  we’ll  falsely  suppose  that  the  set  of  moral  reasons                                
includes  only  the  fact  that  the  second  child  is  drowning.  Since  any  reason  trivially  outweighs  an                                
absence  of  countervailing  reasons,  we’ll  be  forced  to  falsely  conclude  that  we  must  save  the  second                                
child  and  may  not  save  the   rst.  Consequently,  the  assumption  that  reasons  are  facts  leads  to                                
insoluble  dilemmas  like  these  where  we  must  either  include  an  irrelevant  reason  or  exclude  a                              
relevant  one  in  a  weighing  explanation.  
 
By  contrast,  if  normative  reasons  are  primary  reasons,  then  we  can  distinguish  the  two  reasons  given                                
by  a  single  fact  by  associating  them  with  di erent  goals.  Perhaps  the  moral  reason  given  by  the  fact                                    
that  a  child  is  drowning  is  associated  with  the  moral  goal  of  preserving  and  respecting  human  life;                                  
perhaps  the  prudential  reason  is  associated  with  the  prudential  goal  of  earning  rewards  and  praise.                              
So  long  as  moral  and  prudential  goals  do  not  overlap,  we’ll  have  solved  the  problem.  As  a  result,  we                                      
cannot  resist  the  argument  for  primary  reasons  as  normative  reasons  given  by  the  case  of  the  egoist                                  
and  the  altruist  by  asserting  that  because  they  act  on  the  basis  of  the  same  fact,  the  two  agents  act                                        
for  the  same  reason.  The  two  reasons  given  by  that  fact,  one  moral  and  one  prudential, must  be                                    
distinct  if  we  are  to  preserve  reasons’  most  central  role  in  moral  philosophy.  
 
I’ve  just  argued  that  weighing  explanations  depend  on  distinctions  that  facts,  taken  as  reasons,                            
don’t  provide  and  I’ve  proposed  that  we  should  instead  weigh  more  complex  objects  that  resemble                              
primary  reasons.  I’ll  brie y  consider  three  responses  to  this   nal  argument  before  concluding.  The                            
 rst  response  concedes  that  the  problem  for  weighing  explanations  that  I  describe  is  genuine.  But,                              
according  to  this  response,  it  doesn’t  show  that  reasons  are  not  facts.  All  it  shows  is  that  we  need  to                                        
make  our  weighing  explanations  more  complex,  somehow.   
 
A   rst  attempt  at  doing  so  starts  with  my  claim  facts  don’t  provide  all  the  distinctions  that  a                                    
weighing  explanation  requires.  On  its  face,  this  claim  is  odd.  Facts  can  draw  arbitrarily   ne-grained                              
distinctions.  After  all,  conjunction  is  recursively  iterable.  How  then  could  reasons  draw  more                          
distinctions  than  facts?  Indeed,  the  problem  for  weighing  explanations  above  appears  to  dissolve  if                            
we  weigh  only  more   nely-grained  conjunctive  facts  rather  than  the  atomic  facts  initially  used  to                              
generate  the  problem.  Consider  the  di erence  between  the  following:  
1. That  child  is  drowning.  
2. That  child  is  drowning  and  I’ll  be  rewarded  if  I  save  them.  
For  example,  it’s  natural  to  think  that  while  (1)  gives  a  moral  reason  to  save  them,  (2)  doesn’t;  it’s  a                                        
purely  prudential  reason.  This  latter  fact  favours  saving  the  child  in  only  a  prudential  way,  and  not                                  
a  moral  way,  so  it  does  not  undermine  the  weighing  explanation  of  what  you  should,  morally,  do.   
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 However,  observations  about  (2)  do  not  show  what  must  be  shown  to  rebut  the  argument.  That                                
argument  concerns  (1),  and  its  problematic  dual  signi cance,  not  (2).  So  unless  it  can  be  shown                                
through  additional  argument  that  facts  about  (2)  imply  that  (1)  is  not  problematic,  discussion  of                              
(2)  rather  than  (1)  is  merely  a  distraction.  Let  me  also  restate  the  dialectical  import  of  my  claim  that                                      
(1)  gives  both  a  prudential  and  a  moral  reason.  I  am  not  trying  to  defend  a  particular  view  about                                      
which  reasons  are  moral;  I  am  simply  trying  to  defend  a  model  of  normative  reasons  inspired  by                                  
primary  reasons.  Consequently,  though  I  think  it’s  extremely  plausible  that  (1)  gives  both  a  moral                              
and  a  prudential  reason  in  the  context  I’ve  described,  even  if  it  doesn’t,  it  su ces  that  (1)  makes  it                                      
extremely  likely  that some  facts  give  both  moral  and  prudential  reasons,  and  that  those  facts  will                                
create  similar  problems.  That  likelihood  shines  a   attering  light  on  the  dual  aspect  view.   
 
On  a  di erent  way  of  looking  at  the  problem,  it  shows  only  that  the reason  relation ,  the  relational                                    
property  exempli cation  of  which  distinguishes  reason-giving  facts  from  more  prosaic  ones,  is                        
more  complex  than  it  is  ordinarily  thought  to  be.  From  this  point  of  view,  making  the  reason                                  
relation  more  complex  makes  weighing  explanations  correspondingly  more  complex.  For  example,                      
we  might  think  that  the  fact  that  the  rich  child  is  drowning  stands  in two  reason  relations.  It  stands                                      
in  the  moral  reason  relation;  as  a  result,  it  gives  a  moral  reason  to  save  the  child.  But  it  also  stands  in                                            
the  distinct  prudential  reason  relation;  as  a  result,  it  also  gives  a  prudential  reason  to  save  the  child.                                    
Moreover,  this  account  is  consistent  with  the  orthodox  view  for  it  is  consistent  with  the  claim  that                                  
each  normative  reason  is  identical  to  the  fact  that  gives  it.  
 
However,  positing  complex  reason  relations  solves  nothing,  all  by  itself.  When  we  make  relations                            
more   nely-grained,  we  make  the  conditions  under  which  an  object  satis es  the  corresponding                          
relational  property  more   nely  grained.  For  example,  when  we  shift  from  a  conception  of  an                              
intension  that  relates  sentences  to  worlds  to  one  that  relates  sentences  to  worlds  and  times,  we  are                                  
able  to  characterize  how  the  passage  of  time  a ects  a  sentence’s  truth.  But  we  don’t  make  sentences                                  
themselves  more   nely  grained;  only  the  conditions  under  which  they’re  true.  Likewise,  when  we                            
make  the  reason  relation  more   nely  grained  by  adding  a  parameter  re ecting  morality  or  prudence,                              
we  gain  the  ability  to  distinguish  how,  loosely  speaking,  morality  or  prudence  make  a  fact                              
reason-giving.  But  we  do  not  make  reasons  themselves  more   nely  grained.  
 
Crucially,  to  solve  the  problem,  we  need  to  make  reasons  themselves  more   nely  grained,  not                              
simply  the  conditions  under  which  they  are  reasons,  more   nely  grained.  The  problem  shows  that                              
when  o ering  a  weighing  explanation  of  a  normative  property  like  the  one  denoted  by  moral                              
‘should ’ ,  the  objects  weighed  in  that  explanation  cannot  straddle  the  distinction  between  morality                          
and  prudence.  Distinguishing  the  moral  reason  relation  from  the  prudential  reason  relation  doesn’t                          
all  by  itself  make  weighing  explanations  more  complex  for  the  simple  fact  that  weighing                            
explanations  weigh  reasons,  not  reason  relations.  
 
Rather,  only  if  we  also  make  the  weighing  explanation  more  complex,  so  that  it  is  sensitive  to  the                                    
parameter  in  the  reason  relation  that  allegedly  distinguishes  morality  from  prudence,  can  this                          
strategy  address  the  problem.  There  are  at  least  three  general  worries  with  this  approach,  in                              
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 addition  to  the  idiosyncratic  worries  that  come  with  di erent  choices  for  the  parameter  in  question.                              
First,  it  is  entirely ad  hoc ,  motivated  by  a  need  to  solve  the  problem  and  not  by  independent                                    
considerations.  Second,  because  weighing  explanations  are  more  complicated  than  ordinarily                    
thought,  on  this  view,  they  are  less  natural,  and  so  less  appealing.  We  cannot  simply  say  that                                  
morality  requires  the  act  favoured  by  the  balance  of  moral  reasons.  We  must  say  that  morality                                
requires  the  act  favoured  by  the  balance  of  moral  reasons, relative  to  p ,  where p  is  the  parameter  that                                      
distinguishes  morality  from  prudence.  The  naturalness  of  weighing  explanations  like  the   rst                        
largely  accounts  normative  reasons’  centrality  in  contemporary  moral  philosophy.  The  second,                      
more  cumbersome  analysis  undercuts  that  appeal,  so  it  o ers  an  only  pyrrhic  solution  to  the                              
problem.  Finally,  opting  for  this  solution  jettisons  our  easy  account  of to -clause  reason  attributions,                            
which  strongly  suggests  locating  goals  in  the  reasons  themselves  rather  than  the  reason  relation  and                              
which,  as  a  side-bene t,  appears  to  distinguish  morality  and  prudence  thereby  solving  the  problem                            
described  above  in  an  independently  motivated  fashion.   
 
The   nal  response  that  I  wish  to  raise  on  behalf  of  the  orthodoxy  is  the  doubt  that  goals  distinguish                                      
morality  from  prudence,  despite  appearances.  If  some  goals  are  both  prudential  and  moral,  then                            
the  dual  aspect  view  does  not  in  fact  help  to  distinguish  reasons  that  must  be  kept  distinct.  This                                    
worry  is  genuine.  Indeed,  depending  on  how  we  understand  what  it  is  for  a  goal  to  be  moral  or                                      
prudential,  overlap  in  goals  seems  possible.  For  example,  suppose  that  a  goal  is  moral  just  when  its                                  
pursuit  tends  to  make  an  act  morally  right.  Likewise,  suppose  that  a  goal  is  prudential  just  when  its                                    
pursuit  tends  to  make  an  act  prudent.  If  a  view  like  classical  utilitarianism  is  true,  then  this  account                                    
of  what  makes  goals  moral  or  prudential  implies  that  some  goals,  like  that  of  experiencing                              
happiness,  are  both  moral  and  prudential.  On  these  assumptions,  that  goal  is  both  moral  and                              
prudential  because,  other  things  equal,  pursuing  one’s  happiness  tends  to  make  an  act  both                            
prudent  and  moral.  
 
As  a  result,  proponents  of  the  dual  aspect  account  can’t  simply  deny  that  a  goal  is  moral  just  when                                      
and  because  its  pursuit  tends  to  make  an  act  right.  Rather,  they  must  reject any  account  that                                  
similarly  predicts  overlap  in  prudential  and  moral  goals.  However,  there  is  independent  reason  for                            
doing  so.  For  example,  Christine  Swanton  argues,  roughly,  that  one  acts  virtuously  just  when  and                              
because  one’s  act  aims  at  and  realizes  a  virtuous  end.  According  to  her,  moral  goals  aren’t  simply                                  18
the  ones  whose  pursuit  tends  towards  morally  right  action;  they’re  the  ones  that  constitute  virtuous                              
motives  --  whose  successful  pursuit  su ces  for  virtue.  
 
Swanton’s  account  implies  that  prudential  and  moral  goals  do  not  overlap.  Were  overlap  possible,  a                              
purely  sel sh  agent  could  act  just  as  virtuously  as  a  morally  well-intentioned  one,  were  the   rst  to                                  
successfully  pursue  such  a  goal.  But  that’s  impossible:  only  the  well-intentioned  agent  acts                          
virtuously.  So  Swanton’s  account  implies  that  no  virtuous  ends  are  prudential  ones.  Consequently,                          
18   See  “A  Virtue  Ethical  Account  of  Right  Action”  in  Ethics  112  (2001):  32-52.;  on  a  similar  note,  see  also  Sukaina  
Hirji’s  “What's  Aristotelian  about  neo‐Aristotelian  Virtue  Ethics?”  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research  
(forthcoming). 
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 the  worry  that  prudential  and  moral  goals  overlap  rests  on  assumptions  that  are  contestable  on                              
independent  grounds.  
 
To  be  clear,  this  manner  of  addressing  the  third  worry  does  not  compromise  the  dual  aspect                                
account’s  neutrality  on  the  substantive   rst-order  question  of  which  reasons  are  moral  or  of  which                              
goals  are  parts  of  moral  reasons.  Rather,  it  only  requires  committing  to  a  structural  claim  about                                
whether  prudential  and  moral  goals  can  overlap.  Arguments  from  Swanton  and  others  are  grounds                            
for  thinking  that  they  do  not.  But  denying  that  prudential  and  moral  goals  overlap  does  not  require                                  
a rming  that  certain  goals  or  reasons  are  moral  or  prudential.  However,  I  recognize  that  more  may                                
need  to  be  said  to  fully  dispel  this  concern.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
Moral  philosophers  have  largely  ignored  primary  reasons  on  two  grounds.  The   rst  is  the                            
assumption  that  normative  reasons  and  motivating  reasons  are  the  same  kind  of  things  and  the                              
dogma  that  normative  reasons  are  facts.  The  second  is  anti-psychologism  about  all  reasons.  I’ve                            
argued  that  the  dogma  appears  inconsistent  with  weighing  explanations  and  I’ve  shown  how  the                            
most  important  features  of  primary  reasons  as  normative  reasons,  their   neness  of  grain  and  their                              
explanation  of  the  di erent  ways  that  we  attribute  reasons,  do  not  depend  on  psychologism  about                              
reasons.  My  hope  is  that  these  arguments  motivate  renewed  interest  in  Davidson’s  primary  reasons.  
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